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Trends in Communist Media

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INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

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18 JUNE 1975
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SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES

LEADERS ENDORSE CURRENT POLICIES, AVOID CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

There were few if any surprises in the series of speeches Soviet leaders gave to their respective constituents during the period 27 May-13 June in this year's running of the quadrennial elections to the republic Supreme Soviets. Perhaps the most notable thing to be said about them is that they cast little light on two of the issues which have emerged in recent months as possible sources of dispute in the leadership--the current status of detente, and the question of whether consumer goods or producer goods are to enjoy priority in the next five-year plan. None of the speakers betrayed dissatisfaction with detente, and none argued with the decision of the December CPSU plenum to stress producer goods for the current last year of the five-year plan.

The main evidential base suggesting that detente may have become an issue in the regime was the resolution of the April 1975 CPSU plenum, which seemed to strike a more reserved note in its endorsement of this policy than previous comparable party documents had done. In particular, the resolution included a paragraph warning of the opposition to detente being conducted by the "forces of war" in the West, a formulation which seemed calculated to justify a more vigilant attitude toward the West. By this token the current speeches seem to mark a softening of the Soviet foreign policy mood. Though concern over recent statements by Western leaders about relations with Moscow was evident in their speeches, the leadership extolled the fruits of detente to date with a minimum of qualifications.

In this regard, the speeches appear to reflect and complement a trend that has become apparent in the media in recent weeks. Since mid-May at least, Soviet comment has devoted increased attention to detente in the context of decrying signs of an anti-detente backlash in the United States supposedly set off by the Vietnam war. In a series of commentaries, Moscow has drawn attention to various statements in the U.S. press which have suggested that the Vietnam defeat and other U.S. policy reversals had shown detente to be a mistake. While predictably critical of these views, Moscow has adopted an attitude more of sorrow than of anger, arguing that the unsuccessful policies should be assessed on their own terms without dragging detente in as a scapegoat. Whatever the reasons for this new, more positive stance on detente, Moscow seems determined to adopt a posture in the post-Vietnam period which will not aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations.

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The current stage of the economic priorities issue goes back to the December 1974 CPSU plenum, which decided that the growth of producer goods should outpace the growth of consumer goods for the current last year of the five-year plan. Although the decision was not publicly contested, the issue promises to become a bone of contention in connection with the new five-year plan and the new long-term plan which are now in preparation. Some signs of lobbying on behalf of consumer goods have already appeared in the media, but with the possible exception of Mazurov, none of the election speakers seemed tempted to reopen the issue.* By and large they avoided discussing domestic policy issues in detail, giving little evidence one way or another on whether they are divided over such issues.

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS

Politburo members speaking in the electoral campaign for republican Supreme Soviets expressed strong satisfaction with the improvement of East-West relations in recent years despite indications of concern over the thrust of Washington policy in the wake of setbacks in Indochina. In the campaign, which ended with General Secretary Brezhnev's speech on 13 June, there were few signs of the tougher tone on relations with the West that seemed to mark the resolution of the April plenum on foreign policy. Rather, the speeches had more in common with Brezhnev's 8 May V-E Day address, which had struck a conciliatory note by predicting that the evolution of events in Southeast Asia would improve the prospects for U.S.-Soviet detente.

The election speeches were relatively short on specifics of Soviet foreign policy goals. Brezhnev dwelt at length only on relations with the United States, for example, touching briefly on Europe and ignoring altogether Indochina, the Middle East, and relations with the PRC. The individual views of Soviet leaders on such issues as detente and Soviet defense policy were less apparent than in the USSR Supreme Soviet election speeches last year.**

* For a discussion of recent indications of renewed lobbying over economic priorities, see the TRENDS Supplement "Soviet Factions Renew Debate Over Economic Priorities." 23 May 1975.

** Brezhnev's speech was the same length as his last RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech in 1971. His foreign policy remarks in both were considerably shorter and less comprehensive than in his USSR Supreme Soviet election addresses in 1970 and 1974. The 1974 election campaign is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 June 1974, pages 10-17.

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DETENTE The leadership troika of Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin took a long-term view of relations with the West and underscored the continuity of Soviet policy. Brezhnev noted that the necessity of peaceful coexistence was now well established "among the ruling circles of a majority of countries" and was consolidated in a number of "binding official documents." Podgorny, in his speech on 12 June, saw detente "moving confidently ahead," while Kosygin on the 11th concluded that the tendency toward detente "has become a determining characteristic of the international situation." Podgorny's assessment of the international situation this year closely paralleled that of Brezhnev and Kosygin, though last year he had seemed intent on establishing a separate, more cautious position on foreign policy issues.

Despite such statements of satisfaction with the international situation, there were signs of concern about the health of detente in the West and specifically about statements made recently by political leaders in Washington and other Western capitals. None went so far as to criticize individual leaders explicitly, as had Gromyko in his 14 May address in Moscow on the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact.* Brezhnev complained about "politicians" who use slogans of peace but plan for cold war and about "apparently responsible figures in the West" who question whether detente is useful. Kosygin criticized those who call the Soviet Union a "potential enemy" and attribute "nonexistent intentions" to it. Podgorny, giving voice to signs that Moscow is concerned about the implications for detente of the West's economic problems, saw the polarization of opinion over such issues as detente as the usual historical result "when imperialism has had to cope with growing difficulties at home and abroad."

The troika did not call for an alteration in Soviet policy toward the West in response to such recent developments. Podgorny instead noted that the polarization of Western opinion was taking place in an "atmosphere of detente" which "by now no one can afford to ignore." Brezhnev called not for increased vigilance by the Soviet Union but for "consistent and purposeful efforts by statesmen and politicians" with "the skill to resist the opponents of detente and give them no leeway."

* Soviet media handling of Gromyko's remarks is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, page 10.

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All three top leaders spoke specifically about U.S.-Soviet relations. Brezhnev's discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations to the virtual exclusion of other subjects had the effect of underscoring the importance Moscow continues to attach to improving relations with the United States. Brezhnev and Podgornyy spoke in particular of Moscow's desire for a new SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok understanding. Brezhnev also cited other steps toward the improvement of relations with the United States "that are currently being mapped out" in connection with a summit meeting "this year." Kosygin followed now well-established lines in criticizing the U.S. trade bill adopted last year while "supposing" that economic relations would eventually be normalized on the basis of equality.

ARMS CONTROL Brezhnev called on the "great powers" and specifically on the United States and the USSR to work toward an agreement banning "manufacture of new categories of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons." In doing so he formalized earlier representations to the United States on this matter and made more specific a suggestion in his election speech last year that the two countries conclude "a series of agreements which would facilitate an end to the process by which ever new strategic arms systems are developed." Soviet media have begun to publicize expressions of support from abroad for this "new Soviet proposal."

In remarks that could have some implication for Soviet internal discussions on strategic arms, Brezhnev said that the situation in the world was now such that "the leaders of the bourgeois world cannot seriously plan to solve the historic dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms." Brezhnev could have had in mind Defense Minister Grechko's recent use of this phraseology in a more ominous context. In a speech to an all Army conference on 29 May, Grechko had warned that the forces of reaction and aggression "have not abandoned their plans to resolve the dispute between capitalism and socialism by armed means."

OTHER ISSUES Though the leadership troika itself skirted the issue of intellectual and cultural contacts with the West, the addresses of Politburo members Mazurov and Andropov were notable for their discussion of the troublesome ideological concomitants of Soviet detente policy. The same two, along with Suslov, had focused on this issue in last year's election campaign.

Relations with China attracted less concern this year. Though all three top leaders had discussed this perennial issue at some length in 1974 election speeches, only Podgornyy mentioned Peking in passing

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this time. Last year Podgornyy had been the only top leader to warn of China's nuclear potential. Other leaders repeated Moscow's standard complaint that Peking was alining itself with the policies of imperialism.

Europe was treated only briefly in the election campaign this year, in remarks that expressed general satisfaction with developments there. Brezhnev saw the possibility of a "more stable and healthy peace" in Europe as the result in part of CSCE, whose conclusion was "not far off."

DOMESTIC POLICY ASPECTS

The leaders were extremely reticent on economic issues this year. Even Brezhnev, who in his June 1974 USSR Supreme Soviet election speech had discussed agriculture, consumer goods and defense, virtually ignored economic issues this time.

CONSUMER GOODS Mazurov was the most outspoken on domestic policy issues, taking a particularly strong stand on consumer goods. He complained of shortages of some consumer goods and declared that the consumer goods industry and public services "require constant attention." As reported in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, but not in the PRAVDA version, Mazurov declared that "at the present stage . . . conditions have been created which permit successful combination of intensive development of heavy industry and strengthening of the country's defensive might with simultaneous significant raising of the people's welfare."* This argument is similar to one used in the April 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY editorial to support the proposition that the status of the economy permitted greater concentration on consumer goods production.

Mazurov's past speeches have also reflected a consumer goods bias: in a December 1973 speech he complained that consumer goods output was lagging behind planned goals, and in his June 1974 election speech he insisted that "we should adopt special measures to speed construction and expansion of enterprises producing consumer goods." Kosygin adopted a notably defensive attitude on consumer goods. He noted that some people had asked why more funds could not be allocated for housing, roads and other investment projects. Admitting that these tasks "are not being solved as quickly as we would like,"

* For a similar recent argument that heavy industry is sufficiently developed to permit more concentration on consumer goods, presented in the April 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY editorial, see the TRENDS Supplement, "Soviet Factions Renew Debate Over Economic Priorities," 23 May 1975.

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he argued that there was not enough money. In a November 1972 speech he had specifically urged higher growth rates for Group B (consumer goods); in his June 1974 election speech he merely stated that considerable funds were going into consumer goods production.

The only other leaders to discuss consumer goods were longtime heavy industry advocates Solomentsev, Suslov and Kirilenko, none of whom implied any disagreement with current policy. PSFSR Premier Solomentsev declared that "along with development of heavy industry, the RSFSR, in accordance with the main task of the ninth five-year plan, is consistently following the course of comprehensive increases in consumer goods production." Suslov stated that "recent years have been characterized by an increase in consumer goods production" and that "the supply of goods for everyday use for the population is growing at high rates"; he also declared, however, that machine building, power, chemicals and other branches "which determine technical progress" are developing at "preferential rates. Suslov, alone among speakers, made a special point of complaining about shortages of meat in stores, stressing that this was an important component of consumer goods production. Kirilenko declared that the party was striving for "sufficiency" of consumer goods, but, according to PRAVDA's summary version, also "stressed the need to develop machine building at still higher rates"

Suslov and Kirilenko had also spoken favorably about consumer goods in their June 1974 speeches. Brezhnev himself in 1974 had expressed concern about consumer goods development, stating strong dissatisfaction with the growth rates of Group B.

Kirilenko's statement on machine building was the closest anyone came to urging faster development of heavy industry this year. In 1974 no one had actually pushed heavy industry in his election speeches either. The need for continued heavy investment in agriculture was again argued this year by agricultural spokesman Kulakov and Polyanskiy.

DEFENSE A number of speeches mentioned the need for strengthening defense, but none seemed to be making a polemical point of it. Podgornyy stated that until disarmament was realized, the USSR would continue to pay "steady attention to strengthening the defensive might and combat ability of the armed forces." Gromyko declared that as long as the arms race continued, the USSR had to strengthen its defensive might. Suslov took the strongest stand on defense, declaring that "under conditions of the continuing unrestrained arms race" and threats from "all kinds of adventurers,"

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the Soviet Union "is forced to undertake the necessary measures of precaution." Grechko took a more self-assured line, asserting that the country's defense capability was growing along with the growth of the economy and that the combat capability of the armed forces was increasing.

Much the same routine attention to defense was reflected in the June 1974 speeches. Podgornyy had then argued that Western militarists were increasing defense spending and therefore the USSR had to do so also. Brezhnev had mentioned that "we have to spend considerable sums" on economic development and defense, and that the party and state were "continuing to devote undiminished attention to strengthening the defensive might" of the country. Gromyko had stated that while pursuing detente, the Soviet Union would "strengthen the defense capability of its armed forces." Suslov had declared that "we are doing everything necessary to strengthen defense." Grechko had declared that the party was doing everything necessary to maintain defense "at the level of present-day demands" and stressed the "inseparability" of strengthening both peace and defense.

TREATMENT OF BREZHNEV

Brezhnev was lauded by most speakers, but relatively less so by Suslov, Mazurov, Kosygin, Masherov and Rashidov. He was described as head of the Politburo by Podgornyy, Kulakov, Pelshe, Polyanskiy, Gromyko, Grechko, Kunayev, Andropov, Demichev, Ponomarev, Solomentsev and Kapitonov. Kirilenko, Grishin, Romanov, Kapitonov, Katushev and Dolgikh did not use this formulation but did laud him in other ways. Heretofore, only five leaders--Pelshe, Polyanskiy, Demichev, Masherov and Dolgikh--had not called Brezhnev head of the Politburo; now only Masherov and Dolgikh have failed to publicly use this formula. The formula had been originated by Kunayev in 1969, picked up by Shelepin in March 1972 and by Romanov in January 1974. When both Podgornyy and Kosygin used it in February 1974 it was legitimized for general use, and almost all Politburo members began using it in the next few months.

MIDDLE EAST

USSR SUSPICIOUS OF NEW "PARTIAL STEPS" AFTER RABIN U.S. VISIT

Soviet media coverage of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin's 11-15 June visit to the United States has chiefly replayed stock Moscow criticism of Israel's Mideast policies.* Comment has focused on the "contradiction" between Israeli efforts to secure continued U.S. military and financial aid--always a standard theme in coverage of official Israeli visits to Washington--and Tel Aviv's attempts to project an image of diplomatic flexibility and receptiveness to a new Israeli-Egyptian agreement. Moscow insisted that Israeli policy has remained unchanged for eight years, that Israel continues to use various stratagems to delay an overall settlement, and that Tel Aviv intends to "freeze" the situation should a new "partial agreement" be reached. In suggesting that Rabin's visit may have breathed new life into U.S. efforts to achieve another Israeli-Egyptian accord, Moscow routinely denigrated the "step-by-step" approach.

ISRAEL-EGYPT NEGOTIATIONS

Comment on the Rabin visit, like other recent comment, has suggested Soviet suspicions that a U.S.-inspired revival of "step-by-step"

diplomacy is being planned. Moscow seems to be taking a wait-and-see approach concerning the direction of future diplomatic efforts: Its criticism of partial agreements continues, but calls for reconvening the Geneva conference seem to have diminished, although they have appeared in low key in some comment. TASS on 10 June reported without comment President Ford's remark, in his news conference the previous day, that he had in mind "either a resumption of the 'step-by-step negotiations' or, possibly, convening the Geneva conference on the Middle East, or a 'step-by-step' process under the Geneva umbrella." Reporting remarks by Secretary Kissinger on 13 June, Moscow noted that he indicated that another mission by him to the Mideast could not be excluded, but that the timing would depend on the degree of agreement reached by Egypt and Israel. And Kissinger was cited by PRAVDA on the 14th as saying that both Israel and Egypt should modify their positions in order to achieve an interim agreement.

* For Moscow's treatment of Rabin's 10-14 September 1974 visit to the United States, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, pages 4-5.

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Moscow has speculated on possible Israeli concessions and demands, TASS reporting from Washington on the 11th that, according to the U.S. press, Rabin apparently sought assurance of U.S. aid in exchange for "some insignificant 'concessions' by Israel." TASS implied that the concessions would be on the order of Israel's Sinai pullback, announced on 2 June in connection with the reopening of the Suez Canal on the 5th. TASS, along the lines of other Soviet comment, derided that pullback as an easily reversible political gesture of no military consequences.

A Sergey Losev commentary broadcast to North America on the 13th said that "resumption of the so-called shuttle diplomacy" to bring about a second stage Israeli-Egyptian disengagement in the Sinai was a principal theme in Rabin's official talks in Washington. Losev noted Rabin's remark on the 13th that Israel would make concessions on condition that Egypt reciprocated, stressing that Rabin had "in particular insisted on Egypt guaranteeing the passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal on ships flying foreign flags."* Moscow has also noted Israeli Defense Minister Peres' statement on the 19th that Egypt's "nonbelligerency for three years" would be necessary in exchange for Israel's next partial withdrawal from the Sinai.

U.S. ARMS, As in the case of Rabin's previous U.S. visit,
OTHER AID Soviet comment stressed that one of the main purposes of his talks with President Ford and other high officials was to obtain U.S. assurances that Israel would receive the military and financial aid it requires. Assuming that Rabin's trip was successful in this respect, Moscow asserted that continued strong U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic support of Israel was a foregone conclusion despite a brief period of friction in U.S.-Israeli relations following the suspension of Secretary Kissinger's Mideast mission last March. In this connection, Soviet commentators repeated stereotyped charges regarding the influence of pro-Israeli pressure groups on U.S. policy, singling out a letter signed by 76 U.S. Senators and addressed to President Ford in mid-May, and the recent Senate action in amending a military procurement bill to allow long-term U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel on favorable credit terms.

* A Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 10th provided the only Soviet reference thus far to reports in Israeli and U.S. media that in the January 1974 Israeli-Egyptian disengagement negotiations Egypt gave a "secret" pledge to grant Israel "right of navigation" in the Suez Canal. The broadcast intimated that the reports were false.

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Stressing continued U.S. aid to Israel and Tel Aviv's "intransigent" Mideast stand since 1967, a Seyful-Mulyukov commentary broadcast to Arab and European audiences on the 10th professed to see no basis for an optimistic assessment of prospects for a settlement.

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USSR-JAPAN RELATIONS

MOSCOW ISSUES OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT ON SINO-JAPANESE TREATY

A "statement to the government of Japan" carried by TASS on 18 June contained Moscow's first official comment on the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship. The statement accused the Chinese of attempting to draw Japan into their "orbit" and noted that the Soviet Union "counts on" the Japanese to rebuff actions by other states which "create obstacles to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations."

The new Soviet statement's precise authority is not entirely clear. Although it is referred to as a Soviet "government statement" in Moscow broadcast reports in English and Turkish on 18 June, the TASS English version omits the normal introductory attribution used for Soviet government statements. Instead, after opening remarks referring to Chinese efforts to involve Japan in PRC foreign policy, the TASS version vaguely observes that "in this connection it is found necessary in Moscow to state the following considerations" A later passage noted that "the Soviet government expresses the hope" that Japan will not undertake anything "detrimental to the development of relations between the USSR and Japan."

Previous non-official Soviet comment had denounced a Chinese-proposed treaty clause against hegemony by any country in Asia as aimed at the Soviet Union.* The new statement did not specifically refer to the hegemony issue, but noted a Chinese attempt to "complicate" Japanese-Soviet relations with a treaty provision "aimed, first and foremost, against the Soviet Union." The Sino-Japanese treaty talks are currently deadlocked over the hegemony clause, which Tokyo has thus far resisted including in the body of the treaty. The new Soviet statement serves to put Moscow officially on record as objecting to the provision.

On 14 May, in a speech given on the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had noted Chinese "pressure" on Japan and expressed hope that Tokyo would not permit Japanese policy to deviate from the country's "genuine security interests." He had not referred specifically to the Sino-Japanese treaty, however. According to Tokyo media, Gromyko notified the Japanese ambassador in Moscow on 12 June of his intention to express his views further on Soviet-Japanese relations, presumably the basis for the pronouncement carried by TASS.

* Previous Soviet comment on the hegemony issue was discussed in the TRENDS of 7 May, pages 33-35.

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USSR - PRC - PHILIPPINES

MOSCOW COMMENT ON MARCOS VISIT TO CHINA SCORES PRC POLICIES

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' recent visit to China and the 9 June announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states have drawn Moscow comment denouncing Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union and warning of Peking interference in the affairs of Southeast Asian countries.* The Soviet criticism of Peking has focused on PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's remarks at a 7 June banquet for Marcos warning that with one "superpower" withdrawing after its "defeat," the "other superpower" was embarking on a policy of overt and covert expansion in Asia.

An article in the 11 June IZVESTIYA, carried by TASS on the previous day, condemned Teng Hsiao-ping's thesis as a "hackneyed anti-Soviet concoction" and a "delirious accusation" designed to "foul the idea" of a collective security system and to hide "the real objectives and methods of China's great-power policy in Asia." A 12 June Radio Peace and Progress commentary by Soviet "historian" Malayev broadcast in English to Asia, expanded on this same theme, pointing out the "rabidly anti-Soviet nature" of the Chinese claim, asserting that Peking was attempting to influence Manila's policy along an "anti-Soviet course," and warning that the Philippines "can only be harmed by such appeals."

Soviet comment has also attempted to discredit Chinese assurances to President Marcos that China would not interfere in Philippine internal affairs. IZVESTIYA cited an Indonesian commentator for the view that China was "shirking its pledges" of noninterference in the domestic affairs of Asian countries. And a 10 June Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia asserted that "despite all their promises" the Chinese were continuing to support "undermining activities" against neighboring states. Reversing Teng's warning against the USSR, the Soviet radio claimed that Peking had increased such activities in the wake of the American "defeat" in Southeast Asia. Citing instances of Chinese support for antigovernment forces in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the commentary noted that a year had passed since Mao had personally assured the Malaysian prime minister that China would not aid Malaysian rebels, but still there had been no indication that "the Peking leaders are true to their word."

* For a discussion of the Marcos visit to China, see the 11 June 1975 TRENDS, pages 17-18.

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Moscow has indirectly registered its disagreement with Marcos' ebullient assertion, made in his 7 June Peking banquet speech, that China was the "natural leader of the Third World." The 11 June IZVESTIYA article rejected Peking's "unfounded" claim to Asian leadership and maintained that other Asian nations did not acknowledge Peking's "special responsibilities" in the region. A Moscow radio Mandarin-language broadcast to Southeast Asia on 12 June claimed independent Southeast Asian countries were "uneasy" over Peking's policy of support for insurgents and realized that Peking's claims of nonintervention were a "ham guarantee."

- While the question of the establishment of Soviet-Philippine relations is not known to have been raised in Moscow's comment on the Marcos visit to China, this has been touched upon recently by Soviet media. A 24 May Moscow broadcast in Vietnamese, for example, quoted the Philippine President's remarks to an economic conference in Manila the previous day in which he advocated establishing relations "with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries." After Marcos' trip to China a Soviet broadcast in English to Southeast Asia on 14 June, reporting on the 12 June celebration in Moscow of the Philippine National Day, noted remarks by officials of the USSR-Philippines friendship society on the anticipated establishment of diplomatic relations with Manila within a year.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRAGUE CONFERENCE ON REVISIONISM EVOKES YUGOSLAV REBUTTAL

The issue of ideological unity between Moscow and the independently oriented European communist parties during preparations for the projected all-European CP conference was dramatized by the convening of an international symposium in Prague on 10-12 June on the theme of "joint tasks in the struggle against bourgeois ideology, particularly revisionism." While Prague media accounts of the symposium did not link it in any direct way to the European CP conference, the Yugoslavs predictably construed its focus on revisionism as an affront and promptly registered a sharp rebuttal, in the form of a Sunde commentary which deplored the Prague session as a further step in Moscow's drive for ideological conformity by all prospective participants--including Belgrade--in the planned European party conference.

The Prague symposium was billed as a step to implement the results of an earlier Prague meeting on ideological coordination, on 4-5 March, that had been attended by CPSU Secretary Ponomarev and his East European counterparts. In contrast to the publicity for the March meeting, which ended with a communique listing all participants, Prague media accounts of the June session obscured the question of who attended by merely summarizing in brief form the speeches of some participants, including S.V. Aleksandrov, a section head of the CPSU's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet spokesman declared, among other things, that "revisionism, despite indisputable facts, is trying to obscure the revolutionary role of the workers class" in the world struggle for peace and socialism. The host party's spokesman, CPCZ Institute of Marxism-Leninism director Ladislav Novotny, was similarly insensitive to the Yugoslavs' feelings in asserting that the struggle against revisionism was the common international duty of "all" communist and workers parties. RUDE PRAVO on the 13th also reported that the chief editor of the Mongolian party daily UNEN had spoken to the symposium on the subject of "Maoism and the criticism of Maoism." One condition laid down by both Belgrade and Bucharest for their participation in the European CP conference has been that such a gathering must not be used as a forum for criticism of "absent" parties.

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YUGOSLAV RESPONSE Presumably to avoid too direct an affront to the Yugoslavs, Prague media did not mention the projected European CP conference in reporting the 10-12 June meeting deliberating the subject of revisionism. The Yugoslavs, however, in a 14 June commentary by Zagreb radio's Milica Sundic frankly deplored the implications of the Prague meeting for the planned European party conclave. Thus, Sundic deduced from the theme of the Prague symposium--the struggle against revisionism--that the communist parties "of the socialist camp are carrying out serious preparations to enable them to present a united stand on all questions." on the agenda of the upcoming European CP conference. He went on to voice doubt that ruling and nonruling communist parties could have identical "views" even on the subject of European security, which he noted was the theme of the European communist party conference. Sundic seemed to be implying that the European party conference would be redundant when he stressed that the socialist countries should not have two approaches to the issue of peace and security--one at the European Security Conference (CSCE) and another at the followup European CP gathering.

With regard to the ideological theme of the Prague symposium, Sundic asked rhetorically "who" in the communist movement "has the right to conduct a roll call of revisionist and dogmatist parties." He added that such roll calls in the past had always led to "unwanted polemics" harmful to both ruling and nonruling communist parties.

While Soviet media did not report the Prague symposium, PRAVDA on 11 June carried an article by Hungarian party secretary Gyori which focused on the need for tighter ideological coordination through bilateral and multilateral party conferences on "urgent problems of Marxist-Leninist theory."

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VIETNAM

PRG ACTIVITIES REFLECT RESTRICTED ROLE, PLAYED DOWN BY HANOI

The South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) has for the first time issued formal guidance on the administration of South Vietnam, releasing decisions on the adoption of Indochina time and the opening of a national bank. Official statements by the PRG since the communist takeover had previously dealt only with questions of foreign relations, while administrative directions were initiated by the Saigon Military Management Committee. The decision on banking was said to have originated with a resolution of a 4 June meeting of the PRG Council of Ministers, which also discussed such questions as the improvement of security and public welfare, although the Military Committee has continued to issue directions on public order.

Since the end of the war Hanoi media have reflected an equivocal attitude toward the PRG which may be the result of North Vietnamese indecision on the scenario for the final political reunification of the country. At the outset Hanoi undercut the stature of the PRG following the communist victory by failing to credit it with a role in the successful conduct of the war. More recently Hanoi media, departing from past practice, totally ignored the PRG Council of Ministers meeting; and the sixth founding anniversary of the PRG on 6 June passed without Hanoi comment or the usual message of congratulations from North Vietnamese leaders.

HANOI TREATMENT OF PRG POSITION The first peacetime anniversary of the founding of the Provisional Revolutionary Government was observed in Saigon on 6 June with President Huynh Tan Phat hosting a "grand reception" at the headquarters of the Military Management Committee and with the customary biannual meeting of the PRG Council of Ministers, which was also chaired by Phat. While the ceremonies and accompanying rhetoric marking the sixth anniversary appeared to be on a par with previous such celebrations, there was a complete absence of comment or official acknowledgment by the DRV--other than media reportage.

In previous years the PRG anniversary has without exception elicited at least a congratulatory message signed by top DRV leaders and addressed to Huynh Tan Phat and NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho. Ordinarily there has also been a Hanoi reception sponsored by the PRG representation and attended by DRV leaders, as well as editorials marking the occasion in the DRV's two leading newspapers, NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. In 1973 and 1974, in what may have been an attempt by Hanoi to enhance

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the stature of the Provisional Government, large-scale meetings were held in Hanoi and addressed by DRV leaders. This year Hanoi media did note foreign messengers to the PRG on its anniversary and reported on anniversary celebrations in Saigon, but no original Hanoi comment on the event was monitored.

The 4 June PRG Council of Ministers meeting in Saigon was totally ignored by monitored Hanoi media, without even any mention in news reports. By contrast, the last Council session in January had been duly noted in Hanoi media. Although the Liberation Radio and LPA aired reports of the latest Council meeting, most of the monitored coverage--including an opening statement by Huynh Tan Phat and a PRG Foreign Ministry report--was heard only from Saigon radio.

LIMITATIONS ON PRG AUTHORITY Evidence of current limitations on the PRG's authority in the administration of South Vietnam has been manifest even in its recent initiatives--the 4 June Council of Ministers meeting and the Council's "decision," dated 6 June and broadcast by Saigon on the 17th, to allow the Vietnam National Bank to resume operation. Thus, for example, the predominant role of the Military Management Committee, rather than the PRG, in the actual administration of the South was reflected in the Military Committee's major role in the PRG Council meeting. According to the communique on the meeting broadcast by Saigon on the 5th, a representative of the Saigon Military Committee delivered the report to the Council covering crucial immediate problems facing the communists in the South--city management, the building of the administration, security, the stabilization of people's lives, repatriation of urban residents to the countryside, food relief, production, and the development of a "revolutionary culture."

There is also evidence that the PRG's top economic administrators have been reshuffled or supplanted by North Vietnamese personnel. A June Saigon radio report on the Council session indicated that the highest-level economic official present was Duong Ky Hiep, who was identified for the first known time as a vice minister of economy and finance. Hiep is not known to have previously been identified by the media as being a part of the PRG, and he may in fact be an official by the same name who until May 1971 was serving as a member of the North Vietnamese Government Reunification Commission. Also listed at the meeting was a representative of "South Vietnam Economy and Planning Commission," Tran Nhu, whose background is unknown. The commission itself is not known to have been mentioned previously by the media, and it may be a new organ formed from the previously clandestine communist party financial apparatus in the South. This possibility was suggested when the announcement on the

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operation of the Vietnam National Bank identified its governor as "Tran Duong, alias Ba Thai, vice chairman of the PRG Economic and Planning Commission." An official named Tran Duong served as Deputy General Director of the North Vietnamese Central Bank in the early 1960's but he is not known to have appeared in North Vietnam since late 1966 and apparently went South to serve in COSVN under his alias.

REVIEW: SOUTH'S POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS REFLECTED IN MEDIA

Vietnamese communist media currently give only a very narrow picture of developments in South Vietnam, but some indications of the current situation can be derived, for example, from fairly extensive media attention to the problem of maintaining security and organizing the government and military personnel of the former regime. Some evidence has also emerged on the progress being made in the reorganization of South Vietnam's agriculture and the transfer of administrative power from the military to civilian authorities.

PUBLIC ORDER Since the communist takeover of South Vietnam Saigon and Liberation radios have continued to reflect serious concern by the authorities for maintaining public order and security and at the same time have attempted to create an impression that fair treatment is being meted out to former opponents who have agreed to cooperate with the new regime. In this regard, the Military Management Committee issued an 11 June communique ordering "all officers of the puppet armed forces, policemen, intelligence agents and personnel of the puppet administration, as well as members of reactionary political parties" to attend a course in "study reform."

According to a 16 June Saigon radio broadcast of a SAIGON GIAI PHONG article of the 15th, there are still "a number of wicked henchmen of the U.S.-puppet clique . . . [who] are still stubbornly hiding to commit further crimes disturbing the order and security in the city." The article goes on to point out that the attitude of these people has not changed despite the "leniency" they have been granted and despite their being "allowed to live in the same city with the people." Decrying this as an "unacceptable situation," the article in the same context openly demanded that such people have their "thoughts and feelings reformed," and it observed that "tens of thousands" of former ARVN and GVN administrative personnel are now undergoing study reform in Saigon.

An earlier article on study reform in the same newspaper of the 13th and broadcast by Saigon radio the same day went to some lengths to reassure possible candidates for study reform that they would not be

"mistreated physically nor humiliated mentally" in the process. But a follow-up discussion in SAIGON GIAI PHONG on the 17th presented a less benign impression of the thought reform program. Discussing in positive terms the progress of the course during the first four days, the article then asked the rhetorical question whether people who had opposed the revolution for 20 years could unlearn their "hostile attitude" in such a short time. According to the article, those taking the course would be judged mainly on the basis of their actions, and would be given ample opportunity to demonstrate the course's efficacy by their efforts to gain merit through "productive labor" and by helping "wipe out counterrevolutionaries and wicked elements" about whom they have personal knowledge through past association.

It is obvious from media accounts that in addition to persuasion and indoctrination, the new regime is also relying on conventional military methods of coercion to maintain its control of the southern populace. Thus, in a terse announcement broadcast by Liberation Radio on 15 June, it was noted that "several tyrants and intelligence agents" had been "uncovered" in My Tho from 29 May to 8 June. The report then claimed that in one district, the "armed forces and people surrounded and wiped out a group of enemy troop remnants who had refused to report and who had armed themselves to oppose the revolution." In a broadcast by Liberation Radio on the previous day, a "CIA agent who refused to report to the revolution, who continued to act as a U.S. henchman, and who refused to deliver 1,000 tons of paddy and 1.5 million plasters" was reported arrested in Soc Trang Province.

RURAL FARM
COLLECTIVIZATION

While the question of land reform has not received authoritative comment in DRV or PRG media since the communist conquest, there have been scattered indications of rudimentary changes instituted at the local level in the countryside that point in the direction of the collectivized agriculture that prevails in the North. For example, Liberation Radio on 3 June briefly reported that peasants in the "newly liberated areas" of Quang Nam Province had "volunteered" to join the "Liberation Peasants Association" and had organized "labor exchange teams"--one of the first steps taken in the North during the early stages of its agricultural reorganization. The next day Liberation Radio claimed that a hamlet in Quang Tri Province had organized a "collective farming system," explaining that "many families had contributed their buffaloes, cows and land to work together in groups." According to the report, the hamlet now has 13 such groups, comprising an average of 50 workers each. The radio report gave no indication when the hamlet had come under communist control, but since a large section of Quang Tri was "liberated"

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long before the recent offensive, it is likely the peasants involved had a considerable headstart over those in the newly captured areas.

A 10 June NHAN DAN editorial broadcast by Hanoi radio the same day, in discussing the need to return people to their native places in the countryside, revealed that certain rural areas had set up "collective working cells" and that the "collective method of working" has been adopted by some farmers and is becoming "increasingly popular." While there have been a few media reports of those returning to the countryside being allotted land for their use, there have been no indications in monitored Vietnamese communist media to confirm Western news reports that land belonging to "puppets" was being redistributed.

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION Danang was the first major city in South Vietnam to have its administrative functions relinquished by its Military Management Committee and handed over to a revolutionary committee. A 28 May communique of the Danang Municipal Military Management Committee, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 3 June, announced that its duties had been transferred to the Quang Nam-Danang Provincial People's Revolutionary Committee effective 1 June. The briefly worded communique provided no details as to the composition of the new committee or to its exact functions. Vietnamese communist media have not disclosed when a similar switch might be made in Saigon, although a 5 June TASS account of a press conference given by Colonel General Tran Van Tra, chairman of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Management Committee, claimed that Tra had stated that the transfer of power in Saigon and Hue to a civilian administration "has begun."

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PRG'S LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY NOW ORIGINATING FROM SAIGON

Liberation Press Agency (LPA), the official news agency of the PRG, has apparently transferred its base of operations from the Hanoi area to Saigon. Technical observations of LPA's frequencies and scheduling changes for its primary English-language radio-teletype transmission suggest its transmitters are now located in Saigon and may be identical to those used for Saigon telephone communications overseas prior to the communist takeover. On 16 June LPA's 1500 GMT transmission--which has been beamed to Europe and Asia on a daily basis since January 1969--was terminated; on the same date, using frequencies that had formerly been employed by the Saigon overseas telephone circuit, LPA began transmitting at 0900 GMT with an identifying callsign indicating that its place of origin was Saigon. LPA callsigns for radioteletype transmissions in the past had not specified the transmitting site.

Liberation Radio, the official radio of the PRG which has been on the air since February 1962, is still broadcasting from the Hanoi area but may well also transfer its main operations to Saigon. Since the communist takeover Saigon radio has relayed Liberation Radio and Hanoi domestic service for a portion of its broadcast day, but devotes most of its programming to coverage of events concerning the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Thus, Saigon radio thus far has had the character of a municipal station, while reportage and comment broadcast by Liberation Radio have continued to reflect more of a national scope of interest.

PEKING, MOSCOW MARK PRG ANNIVERSARY, SIGN AID ACCORDS

Peking marked the 6 June PRG anniversary with notably less attention than in past years, while Moscow commemorated the date in a fairly standard fashion. Hanoi's major allies also recently took formal action to increase assistance to Vietnam. The Soviet aid agreement was reported by both Hanoi and Moscow, but inexplicably only Hanoi reported the new Sino-Vietnamese accord.

PRG ANNIVERSARY Chinese attention to the PRG anniversary included the usual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a congratulatory message sent to PRG leaders by NPC Chairman Chu Teh and Premier Chou En-lai; however, unlike past years, the anniversary message was broadcast by Peking radio only in Vietnamese and not reported by NCNA. The major Peking gathering on the anniversary was a 4 June film reception, hosted by the PRG ambassador, rather than the usual embassy reception with exchanges of formal remarks. This year the reception was attended by a Chinese delegation

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headed by Politburo member Li Hsien-nien and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. By contrast, receptions in past years had each prompted a turnout of several PRC Politburo members, led by a party vice chairman.

The editorial observed that the PRG represents "the iron will and fundamental interests of the South Vietnamese people." And it went on to express resolute support for the "Vietnamese people's just cause" of unifying their country, and praised Ho Chi Minh's "great objective" of building a unified and independent Vietnam. On past anniversaries Peking had called the PRG the "sole, authentic government" of South Vietnam.

Soviet attention to the anniversary was generally at the same level as last year, with a widely broadcast congratulatory message to the PRG from Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, a reception at the PRG embassy, and a public meeting in Moscow. Soviet attendance at the PRG ambassador's reception on June 6th was equivalent to last year's level, with CPSU Central Committee Secretary and Politburo candidate member Ponomarev and Council of Minister's Deputy Chairman Arkhipov present. There was, however, a reduction in the level of official attendance at the Moscow public meeting on the occasion. In 1974 the Soviet delegation had included CPSU Central Committee Secretary and Politburo candidate member Demichev, Supreme Soviet Presidium Deputy Chairman Grushetskiy, and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, while Soviet media this year have only mentioned that Deputy Chairman of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Sofronov was present and addressed the gathering.

AID PACTS Hanoi radio announced on 9 and 10 June that
ANNOUNCED "nonrefundable emergency aid to Vietnam" had been
 extended by Moscow and Peking, in agreements signed
on 12 and 31 May, respectively. Hanoi noted that the aid was
intended to help "our people" stabilize their lives and restore
production, but did not specify whether the aid was intended for
South Vietnam, the North, or both.

Moscow had previously announced its agreement, in a domestic broadcast on 12 May, and described it as providing economic assistance "to the population of South Vietnam for 1975." Moscow had not previously announced an aid agreement with the PRG for 1975, but had concluded an agreement for economic and technical aid to the DRV for 1975 on 8 December 1974.

Hanoi described the Chinese assistance as "extra aid," an apparent indication that the "protocol" signed in Peking on 31 May was in addition to the agreement on gratuitous Chinese aid to the PRG

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signed on 28 December 1974, and the agreement and protocol on economic and military aid to the DRV for 1975, signed on 28 October 1974. Peking's silence on the accord is the first time in recent years that China has failed to publicize a Sino-Vietnamese aid accord reported by its Vietnamese ally.

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CAMBODIA

RADIO DISCUSSES RECONSTRUCTION, STATUS OF FORMER URBANITES

Phnom Penh radio has recently provided increased information on the organization of Cambodia's economic reconstruction efforts and has discussed for the first time the status of Phnom Penh residents evacuated to the countryside in the days after the communist takeover. The radio has disclosed the widespread functioning of local cooperative production groups in agriculture and has stressed the new regime's successes in restoring industry, communications, and utilities in urban areas. The comment has reaffirmed that ultimate leadership responsibility throughout Cambodia lies with the Cambodian "revolutionary organization"--a presumed euphemism for the Khmer Communist Party--which is depicted as having an extensive network and wide influence in rural Cambodia down to the village level. The party-led Cambodian army is portrayed as the leading organization in the reconstruction of the recently captured urban areas.

Phnom Penh radio's coverage of foreign affairs has been restricted in recent days to a "weekly international news feature" which typically includes criticism of the United States and praise for China and Third World countries, while ignoring developments in Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION AND ORGANIZATION

Phnom Penh radio has carried numerous recent news stories hailing efforts to step up agricultural production by local "solidarity groups for increasing production" (krom samaki bangkor bangkoeun phal). The groups--identified in conventional communist terminology as "mutual aid teams" by Hanoi's VNA English on 17 June--have been portrayed by Phnom Penh as the regime's main force in restoring and developing rural production on the basis of pooling labor, tools, and land at the village level. Thus far Phnom Penh radio has not been heard to refer to formal land reform measures.

According to recent broadcasts, these groups were organized in the communists' "liberated zone" of Cambodia as early as 1972, and their primary mission is to increase the production of rice and other food crops. The groups also repair and expand rural public works such as irrigation dikes and roads and act as a leading force in the development of rural enterprises such as fish and livestock raising and cottage industries. Thus, a 10 June Phnom Penh radio report noted that "various solidarity groups for increasing production

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are involved in developing weaving in Russei village of Oddor Meanchey Province. And a 6 June report said that the "solidarity groups for increasing production are trying to improve fish catches" throughout the country.

"REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION" ROLE Phnom Penh consistently portrays the Cambodian "revolutionary organization" as maintaining "guidance" over the rural solidarity groups. The party has been depicted as having an extensive network down to the village level. For instance, a 16 June commentary said that Cambodian forestry development is proceeding "under the guidance of all echelons of the revolutionary organization including the regional (phumipheak), divisional (phnek), and district (srok) groups." A 13 June Phnom Penh radio interview with the head of a "newly liberated" family who had "just returned" to his native village after being "forced" to live in Phnom Penh for years indicated that the "revolutionary organization" has extensive influence in his village. The family head said, for instance, that upon arrival in the village the revolutionary organization had provided him with land to grow crops and had helped to rebuild his home. The report of the interview represents Phnom Penh's first allusion to the mass exodus from Phnom Penh and other cities that followed the fall of the Lon Nol regime.*

Concerning urban reconstruction, Phnom Penh comment has focused on the role of "our combatants," and has stressed that after defeating the Lon Nol forces the CPNLF has set to work to repair and "clean up" the urban centers held by former regime. There has been no reference to new production organizations in urban areas analogous to the solidarity groups in rural Cambodia, nor has there been mention of nationalization of urban industry, commerce and utilities.

* Phnom Penh last month harshly criticized foreign press reports of the new regime's repressive measures, but did not acknowledge the urban exodus. This criticism was discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May, pages 6-8.

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CHINA

COLLEGE ENROLLMENT POLICY STRESSES POLITICS, PRODUCTIVE LABOR

Recent PRC provincial radio reports announcing the start of China's annual college enrollment drive continue the policy of stressing students' political attitudes, though not to the exclusion of intellectual considerations. Following much publicity this spring for the Chaoyang agricultural university in Liaoning, which has stressed the policy "from the country and back to the country," the drive this year has paid special attention to the need for graduates to return to their units to participate in productive labor after graduation. Mao's 21 July 1968 directive, praising the workers university established by the Shanghai machine tools plant, has also been frequently cited as establishing the policy of "from the factory and back to the factory."

The most detailed account of enrollment standards for regular university entrance this year was carried in a 17 June Nanning radio account of the Kwangsi provincial enrollment conference. The standards discussed are probably nationwide, since the conference studied "the center's policies and regulations on this year's enrollment work." The conference described "political attitude and awareness of line" as the primary admission criteria, but also stated that the students' moral, intellectual, and physical attributes must be weighed. Graduates must in general have the educational background of junior middle school graduates, according to the report, which also affirmed that "attention must be paid to assigning them to their proper specialties." As in previous years, matriculating students must have spent at least two years at labor, generally be no more than 25 years old, and be volunteers for a school assignment. Presumably in response to complaints from areas where many students have been sent to work in the countryside, the report noted that places where such youths are concentrated may send more candidates. The report also emphasized that educated youths from cities must be given the same treatment as those originally from rural areas.

While placing much emphasis on the Chaoyang experience and the need for students to return to their original units after graduation, the broadcast clearly indicated that not all students are in that category. It singled them out from the others in stating that "in the case of students being enrolled 'from the commune and back to the commune,' it is necessary to explain things clearly" to all concerned.

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TECHNICAL INSTITUTES The Chaoyang example and the 21 July workers universities are not only being cited as models by regular universities, but also as provincial examples in establishing more technical institutes colocated with production units. Such institutes serve to reduce youth dissatisfaction with the very limited opportunities for further education and also would furnish production units with technicians trained in the precise skills needed. At a 14 June Canton conference on education, Kwangtung provincial party secretary Wang Shou-tao called for developing a variety of schools, setting up more workers universities in factories, 7 May universities in rural areas, and also expanding sparetime correspondence education. A 12 June NCNA report praised efforts by Hupeh factories and mines to set up workers colleges.

Admissions criteria for workers colleges differ from those of regular institutes of higher education. A 29 May Anhwei broadcast on the opening of the Hefei mining machinery plant's workers university said that the 40 students selected were "outstanding workers" who would be trained into "red and expert" technicians. Twenty-eight percent of the incoming class were said to be CCP members and 58 percent members of the Communist Youth League. The average student had worked for seven years, was 26 years old, and "in the overwhelming majority" of cases had an educational level higher than junior middle school. The students thus seem to be a little older and have considerably more work experience than students selected for regular colleges, but have about the same educational background. Besides a course in politics, the Anhwei college offers eight two-year courses in technical subjects, according to the broadcast.

The 12 June NCNA report on Hupeh workers universities seemed to present more typical examples of such institutions, noting that many of the courses offered are short-term and political in nature. The report acknowledged variations, however, stating that some workers colleges had their own campuses and offer two- and three-year courses of study in technical subjects. While most courses are taught by part-time teachers, the report stated that over a dozen institutes of higher education in Hupeh have regularly sent professors to give classes or write teaching material. Students in the Hupeh workers colleges must have at least three years of work experience, and they receive full pay and benefits while attending school.

Education at lower levels is also being affected by the emphasis on combining education with production. The Canton 14 June rally on educational policy was aimed specifically at learning from a recent Shansi provincial conference held in Hsiyang county, the home of the

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model Tachai brigade, which now seems to have become an educational model. A Kwangtung official who attended the Shansi conference stated that in Tachai teaching has been integrated with the brigade's production activities and that Huiyang county has "combined rural education work with the movement to learn from Tachai." The official stressed that "transformation of the students' thinking" was the primary function of education and noted that in Tachai political tracts were studied in every grade.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON GANDHI'S PROBLEM: Soviet media have quickly come to the defense of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the wake of the 12 June Allahabad High Court decision declaring her 1971 parliamentary election victory null and void because of violations of campaign practices. TASS carried several items describing massive rallies of support for the prime minister, and has replayed a 13 June statement by the Communist Party of India which attributed the court's decision to pressure from "rightwing reaction supported by international imperialism." The TASS reports have played down the potential significance of the court decision, noting only that it has "cast doubts" on the legality of Gandhi's election to parliament while quoting the prime minister's declaration that she had no intention of resigning. TASS suggested that the current crisis was an attempt by right-wing forces to block "progressive social and economic transformations" in India and cited the communist party's statement calling for the "earliest and complete realization of the adopted program of socio-economic reforms."

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: An 18 June Anhwei broadcast identified Sung Pei-chang as Anhwei provincial first party secretary and revolutionary committee chairman. The posts have been vacant since at least December 1973, when Li Te-sheng, then party vice chairman, was named to head the Shenyang military region during the mass transfer of all military region commanders who were also civilian party chiefs. Li had risen to prominence in Anhwei during the cultural revolution, but was resident in Peking since at least early 1971. Unlike the five other provincial first secretaries named since December 1974, Sung's background is predominantly military. He served under Li Te-sheng early in the cultural revolution and in 1967 he was one of the original vice chairmen of the Anhwei revolutionary committee. When the provincial party committee was formed in 1971 he was elected a secretary, and he was elected a full member of the Central Committee in 1973. Last year, while wall posters were subjecting Li to severe criticism which eventually resulted in his losing his post as party vice chairman, Sung was also criticized and disappeared from public view for over six months. The decision to grant Sung the first secretaryship may also signal that the Li Te-sheng case is now closed. Liaoning, Li's present home base, is the only province affected by the 1973 shifts which still has a first secretary vacancy, though there are apparent vacancies in several other provinces whose first secretaries have been long out of public view or who hold central posts.

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PRC-TAIWAN: Peking has sharply rebuked Taipei over the suicide earlier this month of Chang Tieh-shih, one of the 10 former Kuomintang officials recently amnestied by the PRC who have been waiting in Hong Kong for two months for Taipei's permission to travel to Taiwan. A 10 June Peking radio broadcast beamed to Taiwan and a 17 June NCNA article placed all the blame for the death on the "Chiang clique," saying that it resulted from the nationalists' obstruction of Chang Tieh-shih's desire to be reunited with his family on Taiwan. The NCNA article--the first report in Peking's central media on the amnestied officials since their arrival in Hong Kong in mid-April--focused harsh personal criticism on Taipei President Yen Chia-kan for allegedly smearing the former Nationalist officials as "spies" and "tools of united front warfare." NCNA implied that Taipei special agents in Hong Kong had used "intimidation" to help bring on Chang's death, accused the Kuomintang of obstructing funeral arrangements for the deceased, and scorned the "cruelty and feebleness of Chiang Ching-kuo's reactionary rule."

USSR ON CSCE JULY SUMMIT DATE: Moscow, after months of avoiding public mention of any specific date for the third-phase finale of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), has finally gone on record with a call for a July summit. The joint statement on Brezhnev's talks with the GDR's Honecker, in Moscow on 17 June for a one-day "friendly" visit, declared that "at the present time everything necessary has been done for holding the final stage" of the conference at "summit level this July." Only two days earlier Brezhnev had told a West German reporter, in an impromptu interview as he voted in the RSFSR elections, that he believed the CSCE would take place "before the end of the year," adding that no date had yet been agreed but that it should be as soon as possible, and that it was not important whether the date be in June or July. In his 13 June election speech Brezhnev had said that "the greater part of the work has already been done" and the CSCE conclusion "is not far off." (Brezhnev's suggestion of 30 June as the summit date, made in letters to Western leaders this past spring, has not been acknowledged in Soviet media.) Prior to the Brezhnev remarks and the Soviet-GDR call for a July date, a 10 June TASS Paris dispatch had cited French Premier Chirac as saying that he "expected" the Helsinki summit to be held "this summer or early autumn." Recent Moscow comment has suggested considerable movement at Geneva, including some progress on even such a critical issue as the security-related "confidence-building" measures, where the USSR is said to have made "important" initiatives to break the impasse. But at the same time comment has consistently pointed out that there are still "opponents" who would like to delay, if not abort, the conference.

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MOSCOW ON ITALIAN ELECTIONS: The initial Soviet reaction to the 15-16 June Italian regional and local elections has hailed the "new great success" for the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which achieved an unprecedented show of strength, falling short by only two percentage points of matching the ruling Christian Democrats (DC). In limited comment thus far Moscow has outlined three themes it may pursue: First, Moscow claimed that the elections demonstrated the Italians' rejection of the allegedly anticomunist and anti-Soviet campaign conducted by the governing coalition parties, particularly the DC. Second, Moscow reacted favorably to gains by the Socialists (PSI), presumably in anticipation of a possible movement to the left in national politics. Thus, PRAVDA's Rome correspondent Nikolay Prozhogin, in an 18 June article reviewed by TASS, acclaimed the Socialists' "notable success" and observed that "the success of the forces of the left is all the more evident." And third, Moscow suggested that the elections might have ramifications with respect to foreign policy. For example, TASS' 17 June summa, of the election results cited the PSI's daily L'AVANTE as concluding that "great changes" have occurred and it is now "necessary to launch a new foreign policy." TASS also cited the Rome paper IL MESSAGGERO to the effect that the Italians have "supported the PCI, which demonstrated its willingness to pursue a policy of renovations and to defend existing institutions"--a statement with obvious overtones relating to the role of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) in Lisbon's political situation. Soviet media have all but ignored the controversy in recent weeks among the major West European CP's--including the Italian, French, Spanish and Portugues--over the effect of the PCP's policies on the future of the European left. In the Italian election campaign, Christian Democratic leaders had sought to link the PCP policies to the PCI should the latter gain a voice in the Italian Government.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

ENERGY: USSR PLAYS ON DISPUTES, WARNS OF U.S. PRESSURES

In routine comment on world energy diplomacy in recent months, Moscow has continued to disparage Western initiatives and to profess support for the demands of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Exploiting differences among the Western states on the methods of approach in dealing with OPEC, Moscow has depicted the United States as an advocate of confrontation with the oil-producing states and the other Western countries as accepting the need for negotiations. Comment largely blamed the United States for the failure of the French-sponsored April preparatory meeting in Paris, when the consuming countries and the producing states failed to agree on an agenda for a world energy conference. Likewise, Moscow has portrayed the United States as working to establish the International Energy Agency (IEA) as a tool to promote its own interests at the expense of the other Western states. In repeating the stereotyped theme of Western--chiefly U.S.--efforts to disrupt the unity of the OPEC, Moscow has recently been cautioning the OPEC states against Western economic pressures.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE Moscow's few words of support for the concept of a world conference of oil consumers and producers have been calculated to identify Soviet interests with those of the producers and other developing countries. In line with this stance, Soviet media have consistently echoed Arab contentions that the United States had obstructed efforts to hold a conference which would benefit both consumers and producers. Thus Moscow blamed the failure of the April preparatory meeting in Paris to set an agenda for an international conference on U.S. unwillingness to expand discussions beyond the subject of oil, at the same time playing on the theme of U.S.-European differences.

The preparatory conference grew out of a French proposal last fall for a conference on consuming and producing countries. Moscow, which at the time had noted "profound differences" between France and the United States on the energy issue, acknowledged that the Ford-Giscard talks in Martinique in December had produced a "compromise" on energy questions and agreement to hold a consumer-producer conference at the "earliest possible date."* (Subsequently,

* Soviet reaction to the Ford-Giscard talks is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 December 1974, pages 1-4.

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an OPEC summit meeting in Algiers on 4-6 March accepted the idea of a conference "in principle," but insisted that it should study additional issues of raw materials, international monetary system reform, and other problems. The International Energy Agency in February and March worked out a draft plan for the consumer stand at the preparatory conference, which failed to resolve differences over an agenda and did not even set a date for resuming discussions.*)

PRAVDA's Paris correspondent claimed on 18 April that the failure of the Paris meeting again brought out the "extremely deep contradictions" between the leading capitalist states and the developing countries, whose representatives demanded that an international conference discuss not only energy problems but a wide range of questions related to raw material resources--the "main thing" in the long-term economic development of young states. PRAVDA cited "Western observers" for the charge that Washington was continuing its attempts to weaken the OPEC while seeking at the same time to strengthen its influence in the "so-called" IEA. And IZVESTIYA's Polyanov, in a 24 April article, noted in connection with the Paris meeting that "in oil matters West European and American interests by no means coincide--to put it mildly."

Moscow typically showed restraint, however, in criticizing Secretary Kissinger's speech at a 27 May meeting of the IEA in Paris in which he offered a new proposal that the projected international talks consist of three separate conferences--one on oil prices and supplies, which would conduct actual negotiations, and two others on raw materials and the plight of impoverished nations, which would have more the nature of advisory roles and would not supplant, as Kissinger said, "work being done elsewhere." In initial reaction, Moscow cited OPEC and other, unattributed, comment viewing the Secretary's proposals as not going far enough to meeting OPEC demands for a comprehensive, integrated discussion of oil and other commodities. TASS commentator Iordanskiy noted on 11 June that the OPEC countries had "rightly" interpreted the proposals for a separate discussion of the needs of developing nations as a "veiled effort" to play off the oil-producing states against other Third World states. Moscow's

* The preparatory conference, invitations for which were extended by France, was attended by the United States, Japan and the EEC members for the consuming countries; the producing and nonindustrial consuming states were represented by Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela for the OPEC, and Brazil, India and Zaire. The International Energy Agency attended as an observer.

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coolness was also reflected earlier in a 31 May Arabic-language commentary on the 28 May meeting of the IEA's parent organization, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. The broadcast asserted that "the Imperialist West has no intention of willingly and gladly surrendering in order to satisfy the demands of the developing countries."

Although Moscow has not suggested any interest in eventual participation in some future international energy conference, last year Gromyko did seem to leave the door open to a Soviet presence, in a speech at the special UNGA session on raw materials in April 1974. At that time he favored the discussion of world economic problems within a "broad circle of states" and professed Moscow's "readiness to participate in both bilateral and multilateral discussions." More recently, Soviet oil commentator Ruben Andreasyan, in an article in the 1 April PRAVDA, noted OPEC acceptance of the French idea for a meeting of consumers and developing countries, adding that "as far as the Soviet Union is concerned," it supports "the kind of solution to this problem which comprehensively takes into account the interests of both exporters and importers of raw materials." Andreasyan added that "for this it is necessary that quests for solutions be conducted with the participation of a broad circle of states," but he stopped short of repeating Gromyko's reference to Soviet participation.

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY Moscow has portrayed U.S. efforts to organize Western importing states to deal with the energy problem as pressure aimed at promoting U.S. interests at the expense of other IEA members. For example, a 25 February TASS commentary by economics analyst Boris Rachkov accused the United States of setting up the IEA, formed last November, as a "NATO equivalent" designed to insure U.S. domination over Western energy supplies.* And Moscow has questioned Secretary Kissinger's proposal, made in a 3 February speech at the National Press Club in Washington, for a minimum floor price for oil in order to encourage the development of alternative energy sources. SOVIET RUSSIA's Soldatov, among others, asserted in a 5 June article that such a move would be to the advantage of the United States as a major oil producer itself and to the disadvantage of oil-poor West Europe and Japan.

* IEA founding members are Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, and West Germany; New Zealand was later admitted as a member and Norway as an associate. France is, in effect, informally an associate member.

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Moscow has also portrayed the United States as favoring a policy of confrontation with the Arab oil-producing states, while the other IEA members generally have been described as preferring to follow the more "realistic" path of negotiations with OPEC. Stressing these alleged conflicts between the United States and the other IEA members, Soldatov seemed to urge them to reassess their IEA ties to Washington in asserting that they "must decide whether to have talks with OPEC or follow in the wake of trans-atlantic diplomacy."

While emphasizing conflicts within the IEA, Moscow has also acknowledged a growing solidarity among its members. IZVESTIYA commentator Vladimir Osipov, in the March issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, for example, cautioned against "discounting" the cohesiveness of the organization. "Washington has succeeded, if not to unite, at least to bring some order into the ranks of the Western consumers," he declared, concluding that "no doubt some of the United States' closest partners fully share the U.S. stand."

WESTERN "THREATS" TO OIL PRODUCERS Moscow has repeatedly warned of efforts by the West, and particularly the United States, to disrupt OPEC solidarity and cause friction between the OPEC states and the broader mass of developing countries. It has tended to present the threat to OPEC as resting primarily on the West's propensity to use force, drawing on Secretary Kissinger's remark, in an interview in the 13 January issue of BUSINESS WEEK, to the effect that the United States might consider the use of force in the event of "actual strangulation" of the industrialized world.*

However, Moscow has been placing increasing emphasis in recent months on the threat posed by Western economic pressure. Thus IZVESTIYA on 12 March interpreted Secretary Kissinger's proposal for a floor price on oil as intending to place the OPEC countries in the dilemma of having to choose between lowering their prices or facing even bigger price cuts when the West develops alternative energy sources. Similarly, Moscow devoted surprisingly little attention to a statement by Secretary Schlesinger, in the 26 May U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, in which he hinted at the possibility of U.S. military intervention in the Mideast in the event of another oil embargo. Although Moscow replayed critical Arab reaction to the statement, its own comment was far more moderate than that provoked by Secretary Kissinger's

* For a discussion of Moscow's treatment of Secretary Kissinger's BUSINESS WEEK interview, see the TRENDS of 8 January 1975, pages 1-2, and 15 January 1975, pages 4-5.

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remark in January. Moreover, PRAVDA on 25 May quickly reported President Ford's related statement that the United States seeks cooperation in the Mideast rather than antagonism. In minimizing Schlesinger's remark, IZVESTIYA's Matveyev asserted on 29 May that such "thinly veiled threats" no longer enjoy the "unconditional support of many influential bourgeois figures" and cautioned the Arab oil-producing states to beware of "more subtle" economic pressures.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9 - 15 JUNE 1975

<u>Moscow (2448 items)</u>			<u>Peking (920 items)</u>		
Union Republic Supreme	(17%)	26%	Philippine President	(9%)	17%
Soviet Elections			Marcos in PRC		
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	7%]	[Joint Communique	(--)	5%]
[Kosygin Speech	(--)	3%]	on Establishment		
[Podgornyy Speech	(--)	3%]	of Diplomatic Re-		
China	(5%)	5%	lations		
Soviet-Egyptian Friend-	(--)	3%	[Trade Agreement	(--)	3%]
ship Treaty 4th			Gambia President	(--)	13%*
Anniversary			Jawara in PRC		
			Indochina	(7%)	5%
			[PRC Leaders' Mes-	(--)	3%]
			sage to DRV Leaders		
			on National Assem-		
			bly Election		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Jawara.